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Joint Implementation and the Path 
to a Climate Change Regime
At the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the international community set off on 
the task of constructing a global regime to deal with the problem of climate 
change. The task is universally recognized to be notoriously diffcult and com­
plex (note Le Monde 1994). In part this difficulty stems from the political 
ambiguity that attends a problem characterized by substantial scientific uncer­
tainty (note Haas on epistemic communities). Climate change is afflicted by 
both a lack of clarity about the probabilities of temperature increases and the 
valuation of their associated damage. Although there is a reasonable consensus 
among atmospheric scientists about the overall direction and range of probable 
effects on climate of greenhouse gas emissions, there will remain for some 
time debate about the specifics of interaction between the bio and geospheres 
as well as argument about local and regional effects of systemic change (note 
Schneider, Greenhouse Effect). And while these uncertainties would counsel 
some form of current international action as insurance against the more ex­
treme consequences of these events, political actors always resist the imposi­
tion of immediate costs to deal with long run and risky benefits.
If this were not sufficient, the timing of the constitution of a climate change 
regime is equally inpropitious. The Earth Summit coincided with a 
widespread, generally justified, disenchantment with the orthodox instruments 
of public governance, including the regulation of the environment. The period 
around the end of the Cold War has been marked by a unprecendented interest 
in the establishment of unencumbered markets and the political economic 
virtues of competition. At the same time, to all but ideological purists, it re­
mains clear that markets in defined situations (such as the presence of common 
property resources) are incapable of allocating resources optimally. The in- 
firmaties of orthodox regulation implies no escape from the dilemma of ac­
counting for internalizing social costs and benefits after the demise of its tra­
ditional instruments. This dilemma has become been the focus of attention in 
the reconstitution of governance instruments in the internal affairs in many 
nations. One line of reform in domestic systems experiments with the re­
placement of the familiar reliance upon public monopolies as suppliers of so­
cial goods by vouchers and/or mixes of competing public agencies and private 
firms. A second product of the same instinct is the substitution for standard 
setting regulation of economic instruments including social cost taxes or prop­
erty rights. In these cases, the state sets either the price of factors external to 
unregulated markets (taxes) or the quantity of a collective harm allowed 
(quotas or permits) and then allows the market to decide how to minimize re­
source costs. The locus of public policy is moved away from bureaucratic or­
ganization and its associated problems toward market correction through lim­




























































































been concentrated at the domestic level, the logic of the world after regulation 
has equal application to prospective international regimes.
The position of business interests toward climate change has been a contin­
ual concern of the process of institution building inaugurated at Rio. Of 
course, in some mythical world, business would prefer to go on consuming 
environmental services free of charge as they long have. However, an increas­
ingly large segment of the leading edge of the business community has recog­
nized that this is no longer a realistic position. Faced with a necessary choice 
between traditional regulatory mechanisms and economic instruments, the ad­
vantages of the latter for organizations whose expertise is least cost production 
is apparent. In this vein, during the preparation for the Earth Summit, the 
Business Council For Sustainable Development (BCSD), published the book 
Changing Course. Changing Course proposed a wide agenda for collaboration 
between the business community, public and other private actors concerned 
with the global environment. Two of its recommendations are central for our 
purposes. First, the BCSD recognized that the successful design and implemen­
tation of the fundamental social institutions of developed societies, from a 
modem telecommunications infrastructure to social security, have grown from 
a cooperative relation between government and the leading edge of business. 
An inability to forge a common commitment to new policy initiatives shared 
between empowered elements of the public and private sectors has been the 
usual hallmark of failures to adapt to the challenges of modernity. Second, the 
BCSD asserted that better functioning institutions of advanced political 
economies were managed by means of economic incentives rather than bu­
reaucratic regulation. These two insights led the Council to argue that business 
ought undertake an active commitment to the resolution of the common threats 
posed by climate change and biodiversity loss and work toward the enactment 
of a new international legal regime that facilitates learning, pluralism and re­
source economy.
The discussion of the development of joint implementation (JI) should be 
understood in the light of these orientations to environmental policy. 
Economists, whether in academic armchairs or government policy debates, 
have little trouble imagining the basic shape of their ideal regime for global 
climate change. The regime's key features would include:
(1) reliance on taxes or tradable permits in an inclusive (complete) mar­
ket or taxing jurisdiction that will give private actors the proper incen­
tives to seek out and make use of least cost solutions that are economi­
cally efficient and will tend to reduce political opposition to their en­
actment and implementation;
(2) compensation for recognized property rights exchanged as the uses 




























































































(3) low cost monitoring of the ways in which resources are actually 
employed to verify compliance with contractual and financial obliga­
tions assumed in market transactions; these monitoring strategies should 
rely, wherever possible, on the use of incentives such that those affected 
by changes in resources allocations have private interests in compliance 
(such as employment or reputation effects) ;
(4) decentralized systems that are able to leant and retain flexibility in a 
context of substantial uncertainty and risk;
(5) comprehensive solutions so that economic actors are not induced to 
substitute actions that escape the reach of the system; such substitutions 
are less desirable to private actors than the behavior they give up be­
cause of the legal regime, but do nothing to lessen the public problem 
which the regime was enacted to ameliorate.
Even if consensually accepted, each of these goals, poses difficult challenges 
for the design of a global climate change system. It would be foolish to deny 
the effort and ingenuity needed:
(1) to establish new procedures for setting global emissions targets 
which function as social insurance mechanisms against an uncertain 
probability of high damage risks (global warming);
(2) index fairly the value of reducing emissions of alternative green­
house gases and carbon sinks;
(3) allocate permit quotas or tax liabilities between nations and among 
stakeholders within nations;
(4) create deep and efficient markets for trading of present and future 
pollution rights;
(5) develop innovative monitoring and compliance technologies.
It would be even more foolish to act as if political actors in the international 
or national arenas share either the sense of the economic community that in­
surance against high cost risk requires current precaution or the faith that the 
era of direct regulation has been left behind. Wide differences in perceptions 
about the appropriate design of public institutions, the equities of environmen­
tal responsibility, the willingness and capacities to pay for environmental ser­
vices, and the breadth of the agenda for ongoing negotiation remain after the 
ratification of the Rio framework treaties. Without normative clarity in inter­
national law and with widespread confusion about the shape of political al­
liances in the post-Cold War period, it is unlikely that there will be a break­




























































































work with detailed protocol commitments. Yet there are several elements of 
what has already been achieved that can provide a foundation for optimism 
and experimental learning during a period of relative stasis. These include the 
acceptance of a soft target of stabilization of greenhouse emissions by the year 
2000 at 1990 levels by Annex I or industrially developed signatories and the 
licensing of joint implementation as one method of pursuing those targets.
In the simplest terms, we can define joint implementation as the investment 
of funds by actors in nations with high costs of meeting environmental obliga­
tions in* other nations that afford lower cost opportunities (environmental as­
sets) for emissions reduction or sink enhancement. A JI regime envisions pri­
vate investment under public rules that credit the production of environmental 
assets abroad against environmental liabilities at home (note: see below for ex­
amples). The same results could be achieved more indirectly in a mature 
regime of tradable permits. With a global market for emissions rights, a firm 
subjected to environmental obligations in its home jurisdiction would, depend­
ing on relative costs, either reduce pollution internally or purchase rights at 
the going world price that would permit it to emit the level of pollution it ac­
tually causes. The seller of the permits could then invest the sale proceeds to 
support the production of low cost environmental assets and retain the gains 
from trade that motivate the exchange. Relative to this ideal, JI can be re­
garded as a useful, but temporary way station. JI represents an imperfect mar­
ket between two, or a limited set of, parties. In these incomplete and restricted 
markets it is to be expected that transaction costs may initially be expensive, 
contractual prices may vary widely around what would emerge in more per­
fect markets with numerous buyers and sellers as the competitive equilibrium 
value of environmental assets, and substitutive or inefficient behavior will be 
common.
In spite of these predictable problems, JI can offer genuine value as a 
learning phase through which we can enhance the understanding of environ­
mental regimes organized through market instruments. This value will remain 
especially high until the moment when there is sufficient political salience for 
the problem of an effective, universal regime for climate change to resurface 
and an adequate revision of the diverse political expectations now held among 
nations to allow its solution. In the meanwhile, the amount we are able to learn 
about how we ought ultimately to structure less imperfect market regimes will 
depend on how widely II is accepted and allowed to evolve as a pragmatic 
expedient. At present this acceptance is hindered by two mutually reinforcing 
misperceptions. First, environmental or economic purists may point to com­
plexities in building a II regime (e.g., the problem of how to monitor a JI 
project or how to define a baseline) as particular difficulties of joint imple­
mentation, without realizing or acknowledging that the same problems must be 
solved by any regulatory or market based regime. While it is important to 




























































































because its legal form is basically homologous with other market based 
regimes that JI can function as an experimental tool.
The second barrier to experimentation with II as an environmental regime 
is that it is still treated by most private actors, as well as by home and host 
governments for joint implementation projects, as a species of institutional 
exotica that merits distrust. Rather, II ought be conceived as simply another 
variety of foreign investment. The principal distinguishing feature of a II 
project is that all or a part of the investment return is taken in the form of a 
offset of a potential liability in its home country instead of as a normal mone­
tary flow. The investment return in offset credits can easily be combined with 
more orthodox monetary flows to some or all of the investors. It may prove 
particularly useful in projects where II investments supplement governmental 
funds from national or international actors (e.g. the Global Environmental 
Facility or the World Bank) such that the total flow of public and private, 
monetary and offset, benefits adds up to shift the most valued resource alloca­
tion away from current uses toward more sustainable development. JI's odd 
feature of including a private non-monetary return in the total project income 
stream poses some interesting administrative issues for the home country 
which must certify the offset as a legitimate substitute for other action its in­
vesting citizen would otherwise be required to take. In addition, private actors 
will face for a time exceptional transaction costs as they institute procedures 
and develop knowledge that will allow them to evaluate this type of foreign 
investment as well as they do those projects with which they are now familiar. 
However, beyond these innovations, there is no reason for public or private 
actors to treat joint implementation as more or less desirable or dangerous 
than other international flows of capital and services.
In the remainder of this paper I would like to develop further the argu­
ments that: 1) JI is a good platform on which to examine the nature of the 
market based environmental regimes; and 2) that governments and firms 
should treat II as a normal member of the familiar family of foreign invest­
ments.
JI as a variant of an (incomplete) market environmental regime
Many of the basic features of a full trading system in emissions rights that 
argue for the superiority of markets as a global environmental regime appear 
in homologous form in joint implementation transactions. Each II deal auto­
matically compensates recognized property owners for the shifts in resource 
allocations they permit and encourages the discovery of least cost solutions 
within the boundaries of participating jurisdictions. At the same time, II trans­
actions also require a resolution of most of the problematic issues that will 
have to be confronted if a viable market regime is to be institutionalized. For 
example, each II contract would have to specify provisions for verification and 




























































































with contractual terms and crediting procedures. Each transaction would have 
to index and place values upon the several emissions source reductions and 
sink enhancements that are proposed. Perhaps the hardest theoretical and polit­
ical challenge of market based regimes would be the assignment of tradable 
permits or tax liabilities, the point of origin from which market transactions 
would flow. In the case of joint implementation, this issue shows up as the es­
tablishment of a legitimized baseline or business as usual scenario against 
which incremental environmental gains financed by foreign investments will 
be measured. While the challenges in JI cases of determining compliance, 
valuation and baselines are real, it is equally true that lessons learned in meet­
ing these challenges would translate well into the design of the deeper market 
regime at which we ultimately aim.
Beyond the utility of joint implementation as a learning exercise about cen­
tral features of a prospective global market oriented environmental regime, 
there are several strategic advantages of proceeding through JI in the shaping 
of that regime. First, a global property rights regime negotiated between 
sovereign nations would logically proceed through an allocation of tradable 
permits among them according to some politically determined formula. Espe­
cially in those nations which received a supply of permits that exceeded their 
emissions of greenhouse gasses and thus created a surplus available for sale, it 
is likely that these permits would be treated as national assets. The proceeds 
from sale would then accrue to the national treasury. The difficulty with this 
schema is that there would be no necessary link between the compensation paid 
to the seller government for pollution rights foregone and the incentives for 
local actors in the selling nation to alter their behavior in a way consistent with 
environmental objectives. The recent history of developing nations is littered 
with the remains of accords between the central state and international actors 
that failed because they prescribed no effective mechanism that changed the in­
centives of the local parties whose conduct most mattered. JI projects are rela­
tively less likely to fall into this policy trap since the process of authorizing 
credit for proposed transactions will surely in part focus on the project spe­
cific probabilities that the claimed emissions savings or sink enhancement to be 
purchased will eventuate. This will drive investors in the framing of the deal 
to negotiate with local actors essential to this realization. In other words, an 
impersonal market between investors and nation state permit owners leaves the 
question of translating the seller's commitments to reduce pollution into effec­
tive internal programs outside the scope of the specific trade. JI has the virtue 
of internalizing this design problem.
We may note two further advantages of joint implementation in relation to 
the process of building an ideal international regime for climate change. One 
of the problems of regime negotiation in comprehensive fora such as the 
United Nations is the inclusion of a variety of national actors whose principal 
interest is to block progress. These states may even become signatories to a 




























































































obligations of substance and maintain a (negative) voice in the continuing 
working out of implementing protocols. II is by its nature selective or non-in- 
clusive. As long as the international negotiation process does not seriously 
constrain the ability of willing nations to authorize their private firms under 
domestic law the engage in these transactions, II projects may be restricted to 
those national environments which are favorable to learning through experi­
mentation. The potential for blocking coalitions to form and cut off this path 
of institutional development is limited under II because of its local or bilateral 
character.
Finally, the value of JI as an environmental instrument will depend on the 
development of an appropriate institutional infrastructure in the major poten­
tial investor nations such as the United States, Japan, Canada, the European 
Union. While it is not essential that the JI national regimes be identical, there 
is good reason (see below pages) to favor coordination of standards and pro­
cedures that lower transaction costs for private firms present in the several 
national markets. This coordination, whether pursued through the OECD, IEA 
or on a more ad hoc basis, would advance the practice of minilateral regime 
formation that could be extended to other, more comprehensive economic in­
struments. In a political context like the UNFCCC in which agreement on in­
clusive multilateral regimes may for some time be impeded by widely diver­
gent expectations or agendas in the wider community of nations, the leading 
edge of institution building may be displaced to regional or minilateral ar­
rangements. In this circumstance, JI can be seen to trace out the initial steps on 
an alternative route to global regimes through stages or partial accords. In 
turn, these minilateral solutions may feedback to alter the expectations held by 
other nations about their evolving prospects for gain or loss in yet more com­
prehensive negotiations.
In sum, we have argued that joint implementation is a useful first phase in 
the construction of market oriented environmental regimes for two reasons. JI 
projects will allow participating firms and governments to define many of the 
critical elements of all regimes that rely on economic instruments on a project 
by project basis where the stakes are low and flexibility or learning can be 
maximized. Moreover, there are particular gains associated with selectivity 
and local incentives built into JI projects that are not directly available in a 
wider market regime. Correlatively, since we began from the proposition that 
the final goal of a JI phase was to move forward toward a comprehensive 
global market, it must be the case that JI is in important ways an inferior op­
tion to be surpassed in later complete regimes. The relative defects of the JI 
program do not stem from the difficulties of resolving tough questions like 
baseline definition or monitoring since these problems are shared with all 
competing environmental regimes. Rather, the weaknesses of JI arise mainly 
from the fact that it forces the internalization of the costs of climate change 
only in a restricted set of transactions (see Bohm). Incomplete legal regimes 




























































































utilities in California would find II attractive due to decisions of the state Pub­
lic Service Commission that would deny rate adjustments for future liabilities 
associated with fossil fuel emissions, this incentive would be undercut by 
deregulatory rules that permit the import of power to the California grid from 
out of state jurisdictions which do not require cost internalization. Although 
substitution is a problem of all partial regimes, JI by its nature is incomplete. 
Similarly, a JI regime as partial may face general equilibrium problems. If a 
II project to increase fuel switching in China induces power generation 
through cleaner inputs like natural gas, the price of oil may decline as relative 
supplies increase. Other consumers may then substitute oil for power genera­
tion or transport so as to push emissions in the wrong direction. A compre­
hensive global market regime would eliminate these systemic effects that crit­
ics of JI will inevitably point to in opposing phased strategies for regime 
building. Nevertheless, unless one is more sanguine than I believe to be justi­
fied about the prospects for multilateral negotiations to agree on the nature of 
a comprehensive regime, the optimal course may be to favor those partial 
markets, including JI projects, characterized by relatively low negative substi­
tution or price effects.
JI as a variant of a foreign investment: public and private issues
To many public and private actors, joint implementation seems an unfamil­
iar and exotic concept. In a sense this is true. The idea that an organization in 
one nation can meet its legal liabilities in its home country by taking qualifying 
action in another nation is novel. In part, this apparent rarity comes from the 
odd characteristic of climate change systems whereby emissions and sequestra­
tions of greenhouse gasses are fully fungible in the upper atmosphere. This 
fungibility allows the design of extremely flexible solutions that are often in­
appropriate in cases where noxious effects are locally concentrated and those 
who bear them not easily compensated for their losses. In part, however, as we 
will see in the discussion of baseline definition, there are particular ways in 
which general problems of regulatory regimes manifest themselves in a joint 
implementation context that create an illusion of exoticness about these pro­
jects. I have suggested above that this illusion may vanish when it is under­
stood that there is no escape from those asserted deficiencies that are really the 
limitations associated with our entire universe of policy tools. To illustrate this 
hypothesis, consider for a moment the wholly familiar case of budgetary or 
tax expenditures in public finance. First, we normally treat as a policy defect 
the fact that the tax system, like that of the United States, gives deductions to 
charitable contributions that would have been made without the tax benefit. 
The public expenditure produces no new behavior at the margin. Next, we 
worry about the incentives that arise from national health programs that trans­
fer the cost of risk from individuals to the collective. Moral hazard undercuts 
the effectiveness of the expenditure. Finally, we sense the unfairness of giving 
tax breaks only for incremental private expenditures on research and devel­




























































































els of R & D are excluded from the reach of the incentive. Each of these 
problems -  inframarginal expenditure, moral hazard, meritocratic equity -  
defines one of the salient difficulties that plague the construction of a JI 
regime. They are not unique to JI, but they will be cited to contest its value.
We might better understand the purported strangeness of JI if we see that it 
results from the combination of four specific features. These are:
1) complexities in the home country of the investing organization that are 
common to all public policy instruments;
2) political and economic sensitivities that attend the receipt of foreign in­
vestment in the host country of the JI project;
3) the abnormality for businesses of investing in projects with return 
streams that:
a) include non-money flows, and
b) often aggregate disparate public and private benefits.
These novelties are enough to make the design of a JI regime a challenge. 
Properly conceived, they do not transform JI into either the new species of 
colonialism feared by some third world delegations in recent international 
negotiations or an avenue for the evasion of environmental responsibility por­
trayed by green purists in the first world. II presents no more or less than an 
interesting, if imperfect, exploration of a market based environmental regime 
and a variation on the well known theme of liberalized foreign investment 
markets that has been embraced by more and more nations in the post-Cold 
War era. To look at the dimensions of the novel and familiar in JI, we can 
consider in turn the issues this particular investment poses for its central par­
ticipants: home or crediting governments, host governments, individual firms, 
and market making organizations like the BCSD.
Home or crediting country issues
1. General issues presented
Most foreign investment projects have not placed administrative or regula­
tory burdens on the home country of the investor. In general, legal norms of 
extraterritoriality have limited the regulatory processes of home nations to 
their water's edge. The case of JI is more like a hypothetical program wherein 
a nation granted tax benefits or subsidies to its firms for investment programs 
they undertook in other parts of the world. In the latter instance, a home na­
tion would have the same interest in taking steps to ascertain the effectiveness 
of the extraterritorial policy for which it was paying as it would normally 




























































































vesiors the benefit of not meeting liability standards at home, the government 
would have a similar interest in monitoring JI projects abroad to be certain 
that effective compensating measures had been instituted. The occasion of such 
an investigation would be the certification or accrediting process wherein a 
home government is asked to offset a legal liability (or the threat of a liability) 
that would otherwise fall on the investing organization.
From the standpoint of the design of an international regime, we might ask 
whether such home governments can be expected to bear the primary respon­
sibility for assuring the integrity of the projects. First, let us assume that a 
government faced with deciding whether to accredit a JI project has a serious 
commitment to enforcing environmental liabilities at home because it accepts 
the idea that they improve the welfare of its citizenry. This compliant gov­
ernment would then bear the costs of ineffective JI investments which do not 
yield equivalent social benefits to the losses incurred by the failure to reduce 
domestic emissions. In effect, such a state has identical incentives to ensure that 
either JI or domestic projects meet national targets. While it may be suggested 
that the costs of monitoring are lower at home than abroad, these costs can be 
internalized to the parties in the JI transaction. Since it is the total returns of 
alternative investments that matter, relatively higher transactional costs in JI 
contracts will only reduce the gains from trade derived from the differential 
productivity of environmental assets in competing domestic and JI investments. 
Well structured JI projects that go forward remain the efficient option. On the 
other hand, if an Annex I nation chooses to ignore its UNFCCC targets, the 
possibility of cheating through JI as well as by means of domestic instruments 
will not a priori make its behavior as an international scofflaw either any less 
detectable or condemnable.
Although there has been much contention about the merits of the most 
commonly discussed JI projects, carbon sequestration through afforestation or 
reforestation, as well as much misunderstanding of their intent and impact (see 
below page ), we may use such a case to illustrate the categories of issues that 
normally will have to be resolved by the government of the nation which is 
home to the investors in the JI project. First, the home government would 
have to evaluate a suggested schedule of the projected net benefits from in­
creased forestation, in units of carbon sequestered or some other more com­
prehensive index, that would be available as a potential offset over the life of 
the project. This would require data on the carbon economy of the plants and 
soils in the project, expected growth rates or carbon storage trajectories, and 
the end life uses of the biomass involved. Second, to show there is an incre­
mental benefit abroad that justifies release from legal liabilities at home, it 
would be necessary to establish a baseline or a contrary to fact (business as 
usual) scenario that would measure the added sequestration yielded by the 
project relative to that which would have prevailed in the absence of the in­
vestment. Third, there would have to be accepted methodologies to monitor 




























































































efits and actual sequestration. In tills regard it would be useful for JI proposals 
to include consideration of the incentives they provide that can increase the 
probabilities of compliance by local interest groups affected by the prospective 
changes in resource uses. Fourth, to the extent that benefits once credited 
might be lost through an unexpected curtailment of the stream of environmen­
tal services, there might well be need for the contracting parties to describe an 
insurance mechanism to allow the replacement of the lost offset capacity. In 
these issues forestry is similar to potential II investments in fuel switching, 
demand management, technology development, agricultural practices and im­
proved industrial or transport efficiency. In all cases, home governments con­
cerned about the integrity of their crediting process would have to ascertain 
that each JI investment prospectus persuasively demonstrate it has provided 
adequately for evaluation, baseline definition, monitoring or compliance, and 
insurance.
2. Baseline definition
While the design of home nation standards and procedures for the evalua­
tion, monitoring and compliance, and insurance dimensions of JI merits seri­
ous study and imagination, I would like to focus the analysis for the present on 
the subtleties of baseline definition. Baseline definition is central because envi­
ronmental policy innovation is motivated by the effort to alter existing behav­
ior. Unless one can agree about the pre-policy status quo, there is no hope of 
specifying what will count as an induced alteration or would allow us to argue 
that the functional analogue to a public expenditure (a release from liability) is 
justified. The baseline problem is therefore the foundation of further analysis 
and present itself in one form or another in all market oriented environmental 
regimes.
The inescapability of baseline definition problems can be seen across the 
range of economic instruments related to JI. For example, in the debt for na­
ture swaps that explored markets in conservation services, non-governmental 
organizations (NGO's) often purchased the discounted dollar-denominated debt 
of third world nations, exchanged it for local currency at favorable rates, and 
then contributed the proceeds to expand national parks or increase conserva­
tion enforcement budgets in the target country. If the result of such swaps 
would have been no more than a substitution of swapped funds for normal 
public budget allocations or a diversion of deforestation toward another region 
of nation, the willingness of investors to engage in these activities would have 
collapsed. The baseline of existing trends in conservation had to be set and the 
incremental resources monitored in a satisfactory manner for the market to be 
sustained. Similarly, new returns from biodiversity prospecting can add to 
conservation stocks only if there are recognized commitments that define the 
existing baseline trajectory of domestic governmental allocations. Even when 
we speak of complete global or regional markets for tradable permits, there 




























































































initial distribution is the functional equivalent of the baseline that sets the ori­
gin point for JI projects and will induce the same (mal)adaptive behavior. It 
does not matter if we imagine initial global allocation formulas as different in 
their economic and political consequences as rules that distribute pollution 
rights in proportion to gross population or to existing (grandfathered) emis­
sions, it is to be expected that nations will engage in anticipatory efforts to 
raise their quotas and transfer costs to other parties. The dilemmas of baseline 
definition will trouble more complete environmental regimes just as they will 
JI and will import equally intractable policy choices. However, I believe it far 
more likely that these dilemmas can be successfully confronted at the level of 
individual home countries working out national JI regimes than at the level of 
multilateral negotiations contesting the global formulae of permit distribution.
Before trying to generalize these problems analytically, we can outline the 
central issues of baseline definition through anecdotal narratives.
1. The Asian Wall Street Journal in an article on the growing contami­
nation of China associated with rapid economic growth recently re­
ported the following interchange between a rising entrepreneur and an 
official of a Hong Kong firm offering energy and environmental ser­
vices. "The story is always the same: 'We'd love to do it. Can you lend 
us the money?' Then the guy gets into his Mercedes and drives off." The 
lesson of this anecdote is that every expenditure program that offers to 
subsidize economic activity presents a temptation to alter behavior so as 
to increase the size of the expenditures. If third world countries can sell 
off their environmental assets to foreign investors (who in turn receive 
public offsets in the home nation), there will be a natural inclination to 
expand that portfolio of assets as far as possible. This inclination leads to 
a moral hazard that national baselines of regulation or public budgets 
for the environment will be left low or even cut back in order to exter­
nalize as large a percentage of these costs as possible.
2. Assume that two nations in Central America have adopted widely dis­
parate policies that have affected the conservation of primary forests. As 
a result an overwhelming percentage of the land in one nation is has 
been cleared for pasturage and agricultural use, while more than a third 
of the original forests in the other remain in tact. It is decided by NGOs 
in North America to create a JI capital fund in which investors may re­
ceive offset credits for investments whose proceeds are used to induce 
farmers across Central America to switch to new crops and agricultural 
methods that are consistent with the reforestation in native species of 
substantial tracts of currently cleared land. There is no dispute that the 
fund is effective in bringing about these changes and therefore that in­
cremental carbon sequestration is a direct result. If the baseline is set 
such that the nation which had previously neglected forest conservation 




























































































outcome would seem to threaten meritocratic inequity to its neighbor 
which had previously internalized the public costs of carbon emissions 
of its own accord.
3. Thailand also has substantial areas of desiccated lands due to long 
term deforestation and pasturage. It is learned through bioprospecting 
that an extract from a particular tree never domesticated has non-toxic 
pharmaceutical properties. JI investment is attracted to develop a plan­
tation and associated manufacturing activities to: 1) produce the extract 
for the commercially marketable extract; 2) reforest the desiccated re­
gion with an ecology that sustains a wide range of biodiversity; 3) yield 
a sustainable timber harvest with measurable increases in net carbon se­
questration. Income streams from the new project are valuable to phar­
maceutical companies interested in a monetized return, to international 
funds like the GEF that finance biodiversity gains, and to energy utilities 
interested in carbon offsets. The baseline for carbon offsets must in 
some way reflect the issue of which investment is extra-marginal in 
the sense that it will be treated as the necessary factor that should have 
caused the conversion from the less to the more sustainable resource 
use. In this case the marginality problem derives from the presence of 
joint and multiple returns between the several public and private bene­
ficiaries. Other examples developed below examine equally difficult and 
common marginality problems associated with political misallocations, 
information failures and lock in effects (installed bases).
To expand and generalize from these brief exemplary JI narratives, we can 
formulate the range of issues they pose through an index of simple hypotheti­
cal cases:
Case #1: Commercially viable sustainable development
A chemicals firm in Missouri develops a new form of nutrient for cattle 
that has the effect of improving digestion in the cow's first stomach. The 
nutrient can be combined with other dietary supplements and manufac­
tured for sale in India and other third world sites. The results of adding 
this nutritional element to cattle feed is both to increase sustained milk 
yields and quality and to reduce the belching out of methane by cows so 
nourished. The reduction in methane release is measurable by a rela­
tively inexpensive monitoring device that is worn as a collar and does no 
harm to the animal. When the total price of the nutritional supplement, 
including cost of delivery to the cattie raisers, is established, it remains 
less than the increased value of the milk yielded. Can the chemicals 
company claim JI credit for the scientifically determined amount by 
which monitors show that methane emissions per cow have been reduced 




























































































Assume Project #1 has an opportunity cost of X. X then defines the 
highest and best valued market use of die resources employed in Project 
#1. Assume that there is an alternative proposed resource use in Project 
#1 more consistent than X with principles of sustainable development 
and therefore a potential creditable JI investment with the following 
characteristics:
1) Private benefits (profits) to level A;
2) Local public (national) external benefits (e.g. local pollution 
reduction relative to the market use) to level B
3) Public (int'l) biodiversity benefits to level C;
4) Public (int'l) climate change (carbon) benefits to level D
Then suppose that:
a) A > X
Other things being equal, instance a) seems an easy case for which to set 
a JI baseline. Case a) would presumably not qualify for JI credit since 
the sustainable development alternative would be the private solution in 
efficient markets without any need for public intervention. The addition 
of public resources to the private return would be inframarginal as it 
would not have changed the ultimate use of resources. Thus, should 
there be additional public benefits at any level of government from re­
source use A, the usual practice is not to pay for them and share the 
costs with the private investor. This result probably reflects the view 
that public resources are inevitably scarce and could well be applied to 
other projects where they induce changes in behavior. We may note that 
although a public expenditure to pay for the collective benefit consumed 
would not alter the use of resources, it would affect the distribution of 
income. Nor will it always be the case that equity norms will prefer to 
leave the full costs of a project with multiple returns on private in­
vestors since an increased income stream (A + C + D) to the private ac­
tors might be considered a more just distribution than that which would 
result if no tax costs were imposed to finance a public subsidy of the 
project. This equity issue in JI cases may be especially salient if the col­
lective benefits are external to a poor host nation and the only commer­
cial income stream is internal. Whether this equity argument would be 
compelling to home nations remains doubtful since they are unlikely to 
see offset crediting as a preferred vehicle for the delivery of foreign 
aid.
Case #2: Local failure of to internalize social costs
An Osaka energy services company proposes to install home cooking 
stoves burning natural gas in place of coal burning stoves now common 




























































































less than the natural gas stoves and their fuel units by an amount such 
that private consumers do not buy them of their own accord. However, 
the coal stoves produce carbon and sulphur emissions far in excess of 
those of the gas units. While the effects of the carbon emissions con­
tribute to global climate problems, the effects of the sulphur emissions 
are overwhelmingly local and regional. If the municipal, provincial 
and/or national governments in China imposed well designed regulatory 
limits or emissions taxes on the sulphur emissions of coal burning stoves 
to reflect only the pollution costs borne in their areas, substitution of 
natural gas units would become wide spread. Sulphur and carbon emis­
sions are directly correlated so that reductions the emissions of either 
brings verifiable reductions in the other. If the energy services company 
is able to claim JI credit for the per unit reduction in carbon emissions, 
it will be able to sell natural gas units for a price competitive with coal 
even in the absence of Chinese public action to alter the pricing of coal 
burning cooking. If there is no Chinese regulation or taxation in place, 
should the energy company be given JI credit by Japan?
Using Case #1 notation, assume in case #2 that A + B > X:
In case #2, the baseline might be set in at least two places. The problem 
arises from the fact that although economists will argue that the proper 
political duty of the state is to correct private markets for social costs 
and benefits not recorded in resource prices, this obligation is fre­
quently abrogated in most societies and infrequently carried out in third 
world nations. Let us assume there is political failure to correct markets 
because the laws of the host nation of a prospective JI investment do not 
currently force the internalization of the social costs associated with re­
source use X. We might then note that the fact that total national private 
and social costs exceed the benefit of the existing private market use is 
irrelevant to revealed behavior and suggest that the JI baseline be set 
without relation to a hypothetical inclusion of social costs B. In other 
words, if the baseline setting agency ignores B, the influence of a JI 
investment can produce a change that would not have happened in its 
absence. Project certification would then plausibly be effective or extra- 
marginal.
On the other hand, we might argue that a JI baseline be established that 
includes B, even when such action is not yet forthcoming in the home 
nation. It could be pointed out that if sustainable development is the pre­
ferred economic use with reference to the total private and social costs 
of the project internal to national jurisdiction by itself, then these pro­
jects should have been undertaken without JI. This policy would mini­
mize the moral hazard problem that would lead host nations to minimize 
regulation of local social costs in the hope of qualifying for larger in­




























































































imize the equity problem between host nations that otherwise penalizes 
those nations that have on their own protected their environmental 
assets. The cost of this latter standard would be to limit creditable II 
projects to those nations which have actually set high domestic standards 
and eliminate many key nations from participation whose political 
prospects for social cost internalization are low.
Case #3: Joint and multiple returns
An Indonesian mining company owns or has access to large tracts of 
Kalimantan land that abut a railroad right of way leading from its prin­
cipal mine site to its dedicated seaport. The land is presently over­
whelmingly in cattle pasturage, although earlier in this century it was 
primary tropical forest. The company proposes to reforest about 
250,000 hectares of the current grasslands to a mixed pattern of exotics 
and secondary native forest. The exotics would be managed in a combi­
nation of uses for charcoal (used at the mine site), paper, and several 
types of lumber. All have commercial uses, but it is demonstrable that 
the total commercial value of the combined various income streams is 
not sufficient to make the project economically viable at projected inter­
est rates. However, it is possible to calculate the carbon storage value of 
both the short cycle exotics, including the restoration of carbon to the 
atmosphere from the paper and charcoal end uses, and the long cycle 
native reforestation. It is also possible, in principle, to estimate very 
substantial biodiversity gains which result from the restoration of sec­
ondary forest and the reduction of the economic pressures to cut 
remaining primary forests for charcoal supply. Such gains could make 
the project eligible for investment from international funds for biodi­
versity or the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). Should JI credit be 
available to a European investor in the project for its carbon sequestra­
tion value?
In case #3A assume that A + C > X o r A  + D>X:
These situations would appear to be relatively easy cases for JI baseline 
setting. In either case the public element is necessary to induce a change 
of behavior from X to sustainable development. When the international 
payor is a biodiversity fund in cases where C is the collective good be­
ing purchased or a JI certifying agency where the public expenditure is 
made in the form of a reduction in home nation liability, the investment 
is extra-marginal and does not present a difficult public policy issue.
In Case #3B assume that A + B + D > X, but X> A + B and X >




























































































Again this seems an easy case in theory since all public payments (here 
national and international combined) are needed to yield a change in re­
source uses. Since X > A + D, unless the host nation forces the internal­
ization of B, even the addition of D as an external investment will be in­
sufficient to induce the abandonment of X. However, there is no issue 
for the home country crediting agency which will be certain that its 
investment is extramarginal if the sustainable use is actually undertaken. 
This case for crediting JI can easily be extended to include multiple 
public agencies and collective goods. What may be of note about this 
instance is that JI private investment may be perfectly compatible with 
GEF or other public investment where only the aggregated value of 
these separate collective benefits is sufficient to produce resource uses 
consistent with sustainable development.
In Case #3C assume that B > X, and C > X, and D > X
Although this case may look extreme, it is only a version of a classic 
problem in public finance. The efficient use of resources is in sustain­
able development in all instances. The problem is only who is to pay for 
the change in resource use to allow all parties to consume the collective 
goods involved. It is as if two local communities will each gain benefit 
from the building of a common dam and power grid in a combined 
amount that exceeds the total cost of the project, but each is hoping to 
leave the great bulk of the cost on the other party. Again, as in case #2 
the definition of a baseline that forces the internalization of local social 
costs will be attractive to the home nation of JI investors, but will 
restrict participation in JI and impose some equity costs on relatively 
poorer nations. Even if the baseline does not include benefits B, there 
will still be a contest between international agencies and home govern­
ments to divide the costs of the collective benefits of carbon and 
biodiversity.
Case #4: Political failure through inefficient subsidies
An American utility company wishes to enter into the development of 
co-generation facilities with agricultural producers in Brazil. The pro­
ject involves the production of biomass fuels from organic wastes. 
Power would be supplied to the agricultural activities of the producers 
themselves and to the electric grid of the wider region. The price at 
which this new power could be offered exceeds the current price of 
alternative electricity from existing and planned hydro and fossil fuel 
sources. Competing power sources are supplied by a state monopoly 
which has traditionally operated at a loss and priced at low rates that 
reflected political objectives. In addition, much of the cost of the infras­
tructure of hydro power has been paid by subsidized capital from inter­




























































































privatization of its energy industry, but the shape of that legislation is as 
yet undefined. Biomass power would have verifiable gains relative to 
fossil fuels with respect to carbon and relative to hydro with respect to 
methane emissions. Should the American company be given JI credit for 
its investment in the biomass co-generation project?
In Case #4, let the opportunity cost of the private market solution again 
be X. However, assume also that X is a function of some local subsidy 
(not justifiable by correction for an unpriced collective benefit). Assume 
further that X' is the opportunity cost of sustainable development with 
the subsidy removed. Let A be the private return from an alternative 
use of the same resources consistent with principles of sustainable devel­
opment. Finally suppose that X > A; but that X' < A. All other permu­
tations from Case #1 can be played out on these assumptions.
Case #2 was based on the hypothesis that political failure occurs when 
the state does not adequately correct markets for external costs and ben­
efits. Case #4 goes further to note that states just as often positively dis­
tort prices through the use of subsidies not associated with the purchase 
of collective goods. Orthodox economic analysis may quickly decide on 
these facts that the baseline should be drawn such that creditable JI pro­
jects would not be allowed if X' < A. This follows because if the private 
value of resources (A) exceeds the properly priced (non-subsidized or 
otherwise improperly distorted) value of X', then efficient private mar­
kets should have yielded A without external subsidy. Using the term in a 
broad sense, this could be classed as a "no regrets" solution because the 
economic value of A is larger than X' and therefore its implementation 
would maximize social well being. Economists could further point out 
that, as in case #2 above, a standard defining JI against a baseline that 
reflects X rather than X' would pose a moral hazard problem and offer 
no incentive to a host nation terminate existing subsidies.
Against this orthodox interpretation, it must be acknowledged that polit­
ical failure of this type is nearly ubiquitous. The embeddedness of inef­
ficient subsidies in many nations is extremely deep. The long standing 
consensus of economists that the collective will be better off if these 
subsidies are removed has had little impact on their continuing viability. 
The general problem with no regrets strategies of this type is that the 
same groups are not the beneficiaries and payers for the changes pro­
posed. Since empowered groups are normally the disproportionate 
losers from the removal of subsidies, they have opposed reform where 
there is no political mechanism by which those who gain might have 
compensated them for their abolition. In this all too common situation, 
the contrary to fact assertion that better managed private markets should 
have produced resource uses consistent with principles of sustainable 
development may only prevent the growth of a JI market in projects that 




























































































tices. This case is especially salient at present when many important po­
tential JI services nations such as Mexico, Brazil, China and Russia 
which have traditionally subsidized many key sectors are for reasons 
unrelated to environmental policy moving toward market pricing 
policies, in other words, I am suggesting that political failure is an 
essential aspect of what we mean by business as usual and that the JI 
baseline definition merits special attention in periods in which the nature 
of what counts as normal politics is in contest.
Case #5: Information failures
Canadian farmers on the Great Plains routinely practice agricultural 
techniques that are based on deep tillage of the soils. Biologists and soils 
scientists have shown that the ability of prairie soils to fix and store car­
bon when so plowed is approximately one-third of their storage capacity 
when there is no comparable tilling. For reasons unrelated to carbon 
economies, a number of Plains farmers have taken up reformed agricul­
tural practices based on organic or zero till techniques. Their recent 
experience shows that they do not suffer economic losses relative to 
traditional methods following their switch. Nevertheless, knowledge 
about these reformed techniques and their economics is not widespread 
and many government extension services and commercial interests still 
reinforce methods in place. Canadian investors are considering the es­
tablishment of a capital fund which would disseminate information about 
high carbon storage agriculture, provide ongoing consulting, and defray 
the minor costs of conversion to the reformed practices. Should partici­
pants in such a fund be given JI credit for their investments?
In Project #5, let consumers or producers believe the opportunity 
costs of giving up an existing resource use be X. However, let the 
actual opportunity costs of abandoning this use be X*. Again, let 
A represent the private value of an alternative use of the same re­
sources more consistent with principles of sustainable develop­
ment. Finally suppose that X > A but X* < A.
The problem of incomplete information or behavior under uncertainty 
was not a major focus of analysis for much of the 
formative period of neo-classical economics. In recent years it is better 
understood that information should be treated as a scarce commodity 
and that the economics of organizational and transaction costs must be 
analyzed treated with the same care and principles afforded the eco­
nomics of production or transformation. The facts of Case #5 could 
occur because individuals or firms do not correctly perceive the value 
of gaining better information or because they rationally develop routine 
practices which they follow inertially in the absence of a reasonably 




























































































welfare. The problem could also arise because of transaction cost prob­
lems in capital markets. There may be cases where the more sustainable 
practice would be privately beneficial over the lifetime of a project, but 
would involve heavier up front investment in reform than does the 
existing use. Even if the discounted long term benefit stream were posi­
tive, unless financing at the discount rate were available, the theoreti­
cally efficient investment will not occur.
Once it is known with a high degree of certainty that a change in estab­
lished practice will leave consumers or producers better off in terms of 
their private benefit than they were, we can talk about a no regrets case 
in its pure sense. However, given that improvements in information may 
often be like a common property resource, private underinvestment in 
the quality of information may well legitimate a public role in discover­
ing it. Pure no regrets cases then can present the best argument for pub­
lic command and control regulation which imposes a mandatory stan­
dard defined by the demands of the improved practice to correct the 
information failure. This seems a relatively easy case in which to claim 
that the proper JI standard should allow only projects that are incremen­
tal to action that should have been undertaken locally. Such local behav­
ior would be encouraged if crediting nations defined a JI baseline on the 
margin set by the corrected resource use. Only those JI projects would 
be creditable which reduced net emissions to a level below that which 
would result if the optimal regulation were enacted.
The principal limitation of this strategy is that there are probably many 
situations where it is not certain exactly what the corrected efficient 
standard of practice ought to be or where public investment in informa­
tion failures is efficient. There may also be political constraints on en­
acting these standards as a matter of law. In cases where there is a good 
probability of finding sustainable reforms that offer private no regrets 
solutions, a JI investment to define best practice standards or facilitate 
their introduction could have an extremely high payoff. Since the adop­
tion of a pure no regrets practice, other things remaining equal, will 
eliminate more environmentally costly uses in the long run, the envi­
ronmental gains from a relatively small JI investment in correcting in­
formation failures in goods or capital markets would be self-sustaining. 
While this attribute may raise interesting problems for credit evaluation, 
it would argue that the baseline be set initially to certify such JI projects.
Case #6: Installed base failures
There are fifteen cities of between 2 and 12 million people in the coastal 
region of China that are experiencing large scale economic and popula­
tion growth. At present much of the population is composed of migrants 




























































































fleet the low incomes with which they came to the urban centers. It is 
predictable that continued growth will result in more permanent settle­
ment patterns and increased expenditure on transportation expenses to 
and from work. Presumably, this settlement could be built upon alter­
native land use patterns that might be based relatively more on private 
automobile or mass transit Widely different fossil fuel emissions levels 
would be associated with these several land use patterns. Even if it is 
considered environmentally desirable to adopt the more intensive set­
tlement patterns associated with mass transit systems, available gov­
ernmental resources to construct such systems are inadequate. The 
amount of public capital from GEF, World Bank or similar interna­
tional sources is also limited in comparison with the magnitude of the 
task. Yet, once a trend toward land use patterns based on private cars 
has been installed, the pressures that arise from the growth of a Chinese 
automobile industry with its allies in labor and multinational firms will 
make deviation from that trend politically and economically unrealistic. 
If a joint public and private corporation were set up to deflect these 
Chinese cities along a path of low emission transportation systems, 
should international investors in that corporation be credited for II? In 
what amounts and for how long?
In Project #6 assume that X would be the opportunity cost of a 
giving up a defined resource use if the installed base of technol­
ogy were in status S; but that XA would be the opportunity cost of 
the same project if the installed base of technology were in status 
SA. Again, let A represent the private value of an alternative use 
of the same resources more consistent with principles of sustain­
able development. Assume finally that X > A, but that A > X*.
In Case #5 the market failure that occasioned the problem for defining 
the appropriate JI baseline was that, for one reason or another, con­
sumers or producers lacked the necessary information to order their 
economic activities in the way that maximized their private welfare. The 
provision of better quality information lay at the center of the policy 
debate. In Case #6, we can return to the more orthodox assumption that 
economic actors have adequate information to arrange properly their 
resource use choices. The problem is rather that the set of incentives and 
constraints that they are facing in the market leads them acting ratio­
nally to invest their assets in transactions that do not maximize social 
benefits. However, the problem of installed base does not present simply 
another argument for public correction of external costs and benefits. 
The special character of this issue is that once substantial capital invest­
ment has been made in particular forms of widely spread technologies 
or organizations, the social and private costs of starting over with an­
other round of investment to support an alternative more sustainable 



























































































available from the installed practices, (status S). In other words, once 
the infrastructure of status S is in place it can be rational for all private 
and public actors to stay locked in to the original status until capital 
depreciation or an external shock to the system alters these parameters.
Analyses that demonstrate that economic and organizational systems can 
be path dependent have become increasingly frequent in current institu­
tional economics. In such cases, the operative question becomes why the 
system originally became locked in to an installed base that led to a long 
term sub-optimal equilibrium. It is sometimes possible to demonstrate 
that although there is some specifiable global optimum in which the 
system as a whole would be better off, there were no local incentives for 
actors to take the measures that would have allowed their coordinated 
actions in ideal markets to propel the system along the superior path of 
development. But arguments from path dependency also suggest the 
possibility that the operative economic definition of optimality may be 
arbitrary or a function of one's position within the internal history of an 
evolving complex system. Arbitrary in this sense implies that different 
and mutually exclusive patterns of resource use could each be defined as 
efficient depending on which of several potential development paths of 
the system becomes installed as standard practice. Once a substantial 
number of actors commit to rationally adaptive choices in production 
and organization technologies in the expectation that these standard 
practices will continue, there may be progressively fewer incentives for 
others to invest in alternative practices whose payoff will demand a 
broad range of complementary actions. Consequently, what is optimal 
before an evolutionary history is established may then differ from what 
is optimal at a later time within that history when the gains from some 
alternative use of resources become insufficient to compensate for the 
costs of the dislocation of resources and institutions in place. In this 
case, a central question for public policy will be to prevent private 
actors from investing in such a way that the adaptive behavior of others 
causes the evolving system to lock in or lose the flexibility to adjust its 
standard practices before the time when it is clear what is the optimal 
system outcome.
Instances of installed base problems have been studied in a variety of 
technologies from AC/DC electric grids to VCRs. But the analysis could 
well be extended to environmental services. As illustrated by the exam­
ple of Chinese cities, if there were a commitment to automobile inten­
sive transport, public authorities will face demands for more highway 
construction to reduce congestion, that land values and uses will reflect 
adapted consumption and production choices, and that coalitions of 
workers and capitalists will become politically embedded in an expand­
ing auto industry. The dislocation costs associated with moving this in­




























































































environmental gains associated with mass transit, even though we can 
imagine alternative patterns of resource use that would be as economi­
cally valuable and more consistent with sustainable development if the 
overall system were deflected to a different evolutionary trajectory. In a 
theoretical framework that assumes that all organizations, public and 
private, act to pursue their local incentives, it would be naive to assume 
that governmental agencies will automatically see and enact policy solu­
tions aimed at global welfare optima. The state is not a black box that 
can be relied upon to correct simple, let alone sophisticated, market 
problems.
In such instances, business as usual definitions of JI baselines must 
assume that the analytical specification of a global optimum will not lead 
either public or private organizations to act in a coordinated fashion to 
implement it at the critical moments where a system is approaching an 
inflection point of its possible evolutionary trajectories. Well timed and 
placed investments could tip a system along a path of development that 
offered incentives to rational actors to adapt their behavior to a system 
status more consistent with sustainable development. While the envi­
ronmental gains from such strategic intervention in system development 
would be of a different magnitude than those likely to come from JI 
investments we have described in the previous cases, the problems of 
baseline definition and offset measurement would be proportionally 
increased. However, because so large a percentage of greenhouse gas 
emissions growth in the first part of the next century will come from 
China and other successfully expanding economies, the opportunities 
associated with investments in systems without widely installed bases of 
technology and with the pretension of organizational transition seem too 
large to ignore. By definition, in the next years the windows of oppor­
tunity through which JI and other policy instruments can attempt to 
intervene with respect to these systemic behaviors will be closing. At the 
least, maintaining an exploratory openness in the institutional develop­
ment of the JI process which recognizes the complexities deriving from 
the installed base problem would seem an appropriate stance.
We might summarize this discussion of the definition of baselines by home 
governments by emphasizing that a process essential to the development of JI 
as an environmental regime will for some period remain beset by the interplay 
of conflicting policy principles associated with moral hazard, marginality, and 
meritocratic equity. The marginality principles seem easy to state in theory. 
First, in the usual case, public programs should not be expected to pay for 
behavior that private parties have incentives to undertake on their own initia­
tive, even if that behavior yields additional public benefit. Second, baselines 
should be defined so that only future investment which would not have been 
economically justified in the absence of JI accreditation will be authorized. 




























































































cated because of prevalent imperfections and irreversabilities in actual mar­
kets. Through the nearly universal failures to internalize social costs and ben­
efits, economically unjustifiable political interference with prices, informa­
tional costs, and institutional rigidities many transactions that should have 
already occurred in idealized domestic markets have often never occurred.
The authorities of the crediting nadon charged with JI baseline definition 
will have to decide where the margin of business as usual should be drawn. To 
impose an easy standard which qualifies any change from the status quo as 
extramarginal (and thereby eligible for JI credit) is a pragmatic admission of 
the fact that there is, and may persist, a broad, if not unbridgeable, gap 
between the domains of what ought to have happened and what actually hap­
pens in political economy. At the same time, the inclusive drawing of the 
margin has costs. It first threatens the anticipatory reduction of national legal 
regimes to create a wider portfolio of tradable environmental assets. Second, 
an easy rule fails to reward those polities that have imposed on themselves 
higher standards of environmental protection and who are then held to those 
more exacting standards by the ex post definition of business as usual. Finally, 
an easy rule will increase the level of political tension in the crediting country 
as left Green groups will find it easier to argue that the process facilitates the 
efforts of investors to evade their domestic responsibilities without clear gains 
to the global environment. In this way a permissive JI baseline standard will 
create a higher risk of delegitimatizing market oriented instruments. On the 
other hand, a hard rule which insists that all JI projects will be credited only 
when the host jurisdiction has done all that it should have done internally to 
establish the optimal local margin may err in the opposite extreme. A hard 
rule of JI qualification will limit the dangers of moral hazard and the in­
equitable treatment of the deserving at the risk of limiting participation in the 
environmental regime of less progressive, but potentially large emitting and 
sequestering jurisdictions. It is, of course, precisely these latter nations whose 
development paths must be modified if we are to cope successfully with the 
climate change issue. For public agencies trapped in such uncertainty of con­
flicting policy directions, the better initial focus may lie in the development of 
an adequate process than in the quest to specify ex ante the superior rale.
3. Legal process and dynamic games
There are two components of a home nation regime that must be established 
for JI to serve as a foundation for the further exploration of environmental 
markets. One is the crediting process on which the prior discussion centered 
and to which we will return below. The second is the driver or the set of 
incentives that will induce investors to seek an offset or non-monetary return 
from their JI projects. The question of the driver is complicated by the 
idiosyncratic national politics of the post-Rio period. In each of the Annex I 
nations, such as the United States, the European Community, Japan or Canada, 




























































































sions at 1990 levels by the year 2G0Q and to report each year to the interna­
tional community on their progress toward this goal. However, there are no 
specific legal obligations as to how they are either to structure domestic 
programs or mix voluntary and compulsory instruments toward this end. As 
exemplified by the US Climate Change Action Plan, the initial emphasis of 
many national programs will likely fall on voluntary compliance rather than 
the imposition of mandatory and enforceable emissions allocations upon 
domestic private and public organizations. However, as in invariably the case 
with regimes of self-regulation, an expressed willingness of actors to under­
take potentially costly behavior may occur only in the shadow of the law and 
reflect the implicit threat that a more onerous governmental regime will fol­
low if there is a failed private campaign to meet stated targets.
The interplay between self-regulation and the imposition of public controls 
sets up a dynamic game in the development of a II initiative. In the United 
States the first step in this direction has been to create a national registry of 
voluntary actions taken by firms in pursuit of emissions reductions. If the 
quantity of registered actions should be large enough so that the nation meets 
its UNFCCC commitments, there would be no direct offset return to compliant 
firms. They would, instead, enjoy freedom from any later legal limits on their 
practices. Free rider and other collective action problems are obvious in this 
scenario. A second use of the registry would be to assure actors that any cur­
rent investment in emissions reducing projects would bring a retroactive 
crediting against future legal quotas that may be imposed. The more credible 
the threat of future legal obligations, the more valuable this return from cur­
rent anticipatory behavior. In this game, the government must mitigate politi­
cal opposition to mandatory regimes by making clear their likelihood. 
Although free rider problems will remain in this second scenario, the threat of 
prospective liability will define a smaller class of firms that believes that its 
members will most likely bear a disproportionate burden of the future obliga­
tions (e.g. energy companies). This sub-sector will have economic and political 
incentives to work out the design of collective action programs that they hope 
can forestall subsequent, less desirable, legislative or administrative regimes.
In this context, II qualification processes can become relevant to sectoral 
industrial groups that are persuaded that they will suffer a greater than aver­
age probability of becoming enmeshed in a coming legal regulation of the cli­
mate change problem. Such sub-groups of the broader universe of business 
firms will be more likely to enter the II game at an early stage of its develop­
ment in the attempt to influence the ultimate shape of the general rules which 
they are the least likely actors to avoid. In taking the II game seriously leading 
sub-groups will legitimate and define the regime. They will also help to dif­
fuse its practices by providing examples of its institutionalized operations and 
reduce for follower firms the transaction costs of organizational innovation. 
As long as there is: 1) a credible threat of public regulation; 2) a reasonable 




























































































regime; 3) an authoritative insurance that anticipatory action will count against 
any prospective liabilities; and 4) a belief in particular sub-sectors of potential 
regulatees that private collaboration and self-regulation in anticipation of gen­
eral political constraints will yield preferable regulatory outcomes, it is possi­
ble to emulate the effects of a national driver in advance of its formal enact­
ment. Whether any particular national government is capable of clear signals 
and coherent play of this dynamic game is a question of skill in local politics. 
There is no single path along which each Annex I nation must proceed in 
order to establish a credible commitment to its treaty obligations in the politi­
cal discourse of its own system. However, without some adequate, albeit sub­
tle, solution to the driver problem there will be no motivation to undertake JI 
projects within a wider portfolio of environmental transactions.
If an effective driver in put in place, the design of the working rules and 
procedures of an JI regime will occupy center stage. It may useful to think 
through this problem with reference to two ideal types of legal process. The 
dominant model of contemporary regulation is legislative or statutory. This 
model conforms to norms of clarity and equity in subsuming administrative 
decisions under announced and detailed rules. It reflects a convergence of two 
major currents of modem social thought which, on the one hand, favor posi­
tivist theories of governance that locate sovereign power in the legislator and, 
on the other, the planning competence and foresight of experts entrusted with 
central roles in the rule drafting process. The alternative ideal type of legal 
process can be imagined as a common law process. In this usage there is no 
intended connection between the concept of a common law process and the 
English common law whose name is being borrowed. The organizing principle 
is that the law sets into action an evolving process composed of a limited set of 
general standards or guidelines to frame decisions and an administrative body 
to interpret and apply these directive principles. The adjudicating body to 
which applicants submit petitions for decision may often be constituted to rep­
resent the most affected interests and other public agencies with overlapping 
jurisdiction over the subjects at issue. The key fault line between these models 
is that in the latter JI rules are expected to emerge through the crafting of a 
jurisprudence or case law over time. Rather than attempting through a quasi­
legislative exercise to reconcile the conflicting demands of marginality, moral 
hazard and meritocratic equity into a statute that defines JI qualification, the 
common law model would rely on case decision and reconsideration to arrive 
only over time at a recognizable body of precedent.
Several arguments support the less orthodox proposition that the building an 
inclusive administrative process that will produce a common law jurisprudence 
is the better route to a functioning JI regime. First, the extended decision pro­
cess offers repeated opportunities for interested private parties to be given a 
hearing on relevant aspects of the rule making procedure. These parties might 
more easily be precluded from realizing and voicing their concerns in a more 




























































































may well be supplied only by parties from the host country (e.g. moral hazard 
risks or monitoring capabilities), an open and continuing process may better 
elicit the involvement of the entire appropriate community. Second, the com 
mon law model is more flexible and conducive to learning in a field where 
both normative and factual understanding is still primitive. The early years of 
JI will be marked by organizational, scientific and political innovation and' 
uncertainty. It is precisely in these circumstances that a knowledge production 
system that is explicitly evolutionary is likely to have competitive advantages 
over other institutions. Third, the development of a JI regime is a dynamic 
game at the international level as well as at the domestic level. Once any set of 
decisions is made public, it is to be expected that nations and firms will adjust 
their behavior to the signals they believe are being put forward. If the credit­
ing authority makes use of the malleability of the canons of interpretation of 
precedent that characterizes most other common law jurisdictions, it will be 
easier to adjust the balance between competing general standards across the 
flow of cases to limit the gains from strategic behavior. Finally, the autonomy 
or self-regulation of a common law jurisprudence minimizes the costs imposed 
by individual mistaken decisions. The willingness to make errors to be cor­
rected in later cases is especially important in the JI context. For investors to 
proceed with timely projects they will demand certainty of return through 
creditable offsets. This certainty can be offered either by fixed rules or by a 
quick administrative turn around of project applications. A common law based 
process that rapidly assured a certain return for each creditable project and yet 
retained a systemic ability to adjust the conditions of play for new proposals as 
the learning process went forward would be of the greatest worth in the for­
mative period of a JI regime.
In situations marked by substantial uncertainty and putative high marginal 
returns to learning, case by case adjudication generally stands on its strongest 
footing. In the particular instance of JI the need for systemic flexibility to 
incorporate the lessons of a learning process is further enhanced because JI is 
not the ultimate objective of the institutional evolution it initiates. JI will only 
be successful if it supersedes its foundations through the emergence of more 
complete regimes. The argument for JI begins in the diplomatic deadlock 
associated with very divergent expectations about the proper shape of a broad 
multilateral regime of taxes or tradable permits. It continues with the proposi­
tion that the experience of JI should lead toward a revision of such expecta­
tions and widening circles of agreement about the issues like baselines and 
compliance that are the current sources of dissensus. The JI process must then 
anticipate its capacity to adjust to institutional innovations that lead in the di­
rections that JI is intended to explore. In this sense, an early jurisprudential 
experimentation with alternative norms in multiple fora and nations, followed 
by codifications of established practices in national law and international 





























































































We can consider the merits of a regime that is designed to learn and evolve 
by speculating on one possible path of JI development. Let us suppose that the 
initial applications for JI approval come largely from energy producers 
because of their disproportionate sectoral interest in prospective carbon emis­
sions regulation. The original project descriptions would be submitted and 
considered on a case by case basis and would be required to contract for pro­
ject specific solutions to the baseline, monitoring and compliance, insurance, 
and evaluation questions. As long as the proposals met all foreign investment 
and domestic laws of the host country, there would be no need for intricate 
coordination between the systems of home and host nations. It need not be 
taken for granted that the resolution of the key issues like the setting of the 
baseline would be the same for projects in India, Brazil and Costa Rica. In 
each instance the definition of what constitutes business as usual could be set in 
the context of a particular political economy whose past history and future 
trajectories of practices like internalization of social cost, subsidization, cor­
ruption, information provision and risks of moral hazard could be individu­
ated and even negotiated as a condition of JI qualification. These parameters 
might even be set with reference to sub-national regions that display a capacity 
for independent action from their national governments. Baseline definitions 
could evolve over time depending on strategic responses and good faith com­
pliance with both contractual obligations and broader political expectations. In 
effect, the first stage of the JI process would be unilateral and case specific as 
the dynamics of competitive responses to the evolving application of broad 
standards were fleshed out.
A second stage in this hypothetical JI development scenario would look to­
ward the growth of bilateral agreements between host/home, home/horne, and, 
perhaps, host/host nations. In host/home treaties, general provisions about 
baseline definition for all projects in the host country could be negotiated so as 
to assure the host state a legitimate voice in the standard setting process. Base­
lines could be set on a conditional and evolving schedule to lead toward envi­
ronmental improvements and away from the temptations of moral hazard. 
Such accords would have advantages for host nations since they would promise 
reductions in transaction costs over project by project approval and would thus 
offer signing nations a competitive edge in attracting JI projects. Bilateral 
agreements could also offer an indirect mode of making side payments to those 
countries which merit equitable recompense for their political commitment to 
high domestic baselines. If the original treaties are signed with nations seen to 
be acting in good environmental faith, the early facilitation of project devel­
opment would increase their share of the environmental service market and 
foster the growth of complementary industries like financing and monitoring 
available to JI contracting parties. Accords could also help institutionalize 
broader markets in host countries by qualifying syndicated or multi-project 
investment instruments organized by public or private funds for offset credit. 
Strategic use of accords as rewards for domestic environmental regulation 




























































































and, with time, to narrow the gap between first and third world expectations 
about the allocation formulae for more inclusive market regimes.
Home/home nation agreements that define common standards for II project 
certification are also likely to evolve in an institutional regime designed to 
facilitate learning. For example, if the United States has moved to meet its 
UNFCCC targets in a more efficient fashion through II projects whose unit 
costs of emissions reduction are below those available in Japan or the EC 
where II might be more restrictively qualified, it is to be expected that regula­
tory competition will initiate political and economic pressures to effect some 
convergence of national environmental rules and procedures. Obviously, there 
may even be threats to withdraw from the Annex I regime unless some 
threshold of uniformity constrains the legitimate modes of meeting targets is 
available to those nations sharing the stabilization goal. However, it seems far 
more likely that this common threshold can be defined in negotiations between 
the advanced industrial countries than in a multilateral forum with far more 
diverse agendas and interests. Again, the result of this competitive evolution of 
standards is a narrowing of the range of expectations that could advance the 
prospects for a more complete international regime by restricting the number 
of contending positions to define the operative provisions of that regime. (It is 
also possible to imagine OPEC like agreements between potential supplier 
nations of II services that establish common negotiating positions on issues like 
baselines or cartelize asset prices. Until now, this has been a more prevalent 
theme in the negotiations surrounding the biodiversity treaty than those around 
climate change. Given the history of commodity agreements and the different 
national tastes for domestic environmental protection among potential supplier 
nations, this result may be a less probable outcome of the evolution of the II 
process. See discussion below pages.)
A final phase of II regime development might foresee the growth of both 
home/home and host/home agreements beyond bilateral agreements toward the 
creation of minilateral or regional treaties. Among home/host regime this 
would result in bubbles being placed over contracting jurisdictions within 
which there was a defined agreement of common II standards and practices. 
This prospective harmonization of regulatory practices like baselines and 
compliance standards would assume that II jurisprudence has advanced to the 
point that the basis for an inclusive environmental regime would be far more 
apparent than it now is. The nature of that jurisprudence would probably 
depend on the sequencing and competitive evolution of less complete accords. 
Once minilateral agreements have proliferated, it will be likely that II has run 
its useful course. It may then be practical to negotiate more comprehensive, 
though not necessarily universal, regimes around the reformed range of politi­
cal expectations. This speculation suggests that the more realistic path to a 
multilateral environmental order may lie through unilateral, bilateral and 
minilateral or regional accords. Yet before endorsing its virtues, we should 




























































































to accommodate flexible learning and strategic response capacity. In turn this 
will require the maintenance of a international legal system where these exper­
imental possibilities have not been cut off by the promulgation of restrictive 
regulatory codes on permissible national behavior.
Host country issues
In the several meetings of the International Negotiating Committee section 
on Joint Implementation that have succeeded the signing of the UNFCCC con­
vention the major point of controversy and resistance to JI has been its 
significance for host countries. In multilateral discussions JI has been casti­
gated as an extension of colonialism and a trap for unwary and unsophisticated 
third world states that would be unable to understand or effectively manage JI 
projects. Constraining rules have been proposed, though not yet adopted, to 
limit the range of nations where JI could be carried out and the percentage of 
home country emissions that could be offset by JI credits, to reallocate emis­
sions credits from home country investors to host country organizations or 
credit banks, and otherwise to restrict markets in which JI would organize 
environmental services. To analyze the appropriate roles host countries might 
play in the organization of these markets and the regulation of JI investment, 
we can divide their potential activities into two distinct classes. The first class 
concerns the incorporation of JI into the general regime for foreign invest­
ment which is practiced in the host nation. The second class of activities con­
cerns the capacity of the host country to organize the market for JI projects so 
as to improve its share of the global market for environmental services and to 
foster the development of complementary services for JI that will return a 
larger share of the total value added by these projects to local producers.
7. Should host countries develop special JI regimes?
Much of the thrust of multilateral opposition to JI has centered on the in­
ability of host nations to deal with purported threats to their national 
sovereignty represented in colorful metaphors of exploitation like "carbon 
colonialism" or "low hanging fruit". The goal of this criticism is an interna­
tional regulatory regime that will restrict environmental markets and curtail 
this threat. On the other hand, this essay has argued throughout that JI is an 
innovative, but familiar form of foreign investment. If foreign investment 
whose return is received in money rather than offset credits is well managed 
by the national regime of the host country, it would follow logically that local 
concerns would be alleviated as long as JI projects were treated as were more 
orthodox foreign investment projects that are their monetized analogues. This 
argument does not imply that all foreign investment projects ought to be sub- 
ect to exactly the same regulatory controls. For instance, all investments might 
be similarly treated with respect to toxic waste disposal; only some investments 




























































































stocks, My point is that operative distinctions between foreign investments 
ought to relate to entena other than the form in which they yield returns.
The irony of the oppositional tone of much of the multilateral JX debate is 
twofold. First, it is taking place in an era in which the general reputation of 
the value of foreign investment is ever more positive. The restrictive attitudes 
to foreign investment that characterized much of the last decades of depen­
dencia and socialism have been receding almost universally. Nevertheless, II 
projects are singled out in the post-Rio diplomatic forum for limitations in 
international markets that are fading away for other forms of foreign invest­
ment at the national level. Second, one of the recurrent themes of the third 
world disinclination to accept comprehensive market instruments as the basis 
for a climate change regime is its intrusion upon national sovereignty. Yet that 
same sovereignty is exercised daily and independently by national public au­
thorities that decide how they will intervene in private markets to reflect total 
social costs and benefits in their own jurisdiction. If foreign investors or gov­
ernments were to interfere in the local exercise of these decisions, they would 
be rightly assaulted as neo-colonialists under the sovereignty principles com­
monly asserted. However, the case against II flies in the face of the usual insis­
tence that all nations have the capacity to manage their domestic resources and 
possess the voluntary prerogative to yield this capacity only through treaty. It 
seems incoherent to claim that the competent control of monetized foreign 
investment is at the heart of the protection of sovereignty while the capacity of 
those same nations to make autonomous decisions on JI or non-monetized 
investment should be restricted in order to preserve the same principle.
Four arguments are most commonly heard why host countries need special 
regulatory regimes for JI. The include asymmetrical negotiating capacity, car­
bon colonialism (asset mispricing), low hanging fruit (depletable asset man­
agement), and technology forcing. These same arguments are advanced to jus­
tify the idea that the Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC Convention 
should adopt rules that limit the scope of JI to preclude the possibility that 
national regulation will not be able to meet the special challenges JI poses. We 
can examine these arguments sequentially and, in each case, evaluate their 
merits with respect to two dimensions. First, we can consider the question of 
whether individual host nations face dangers associated with JI which they 
have been unable to resolve in other forms of foreign investment. If the 
answer to this question is that there are no relevant differences between the 
issues posed by the entire portfolio of foreign investment, we can then ask 
whether it is advisable to pursue accords for multilateral coordination between 
the various host country investment regimes if national regulation is to be 
effective.
The arguments for JI's danger are of varying quality. For example, it is said 
that host nations will receive low prices for the environmental services they 




























































































and lack knowledge of market values. It is true that in the formative period of 
any market it is to be expected that there will be more variability of transac­
tion prices than would be the case in a deep and established market. However, 
this variability does not systematically bias the position of buyers or sellers. In 
the case of JI, there is no systematic reason to believe that the access of host 
nation sellers to expert legal, financial or scientific expertise is any less than 
that of investors. The same specialized organizations offer these services to all 
buyers on an international market. Homogeneity of supply in complementary 
services for negotiation and project evaluation has been the usual practice in 
other foreign investment markets for at least several decades. JI cannot be dis­
tinguished from the rest of the foreign investment universe in this regard.
Other claims about the regulatory complexity of JI deserve more attention. 
The first of these may be symbolized by the fear of "carbon colonialism". 
Since the most publicized voluntary projects that have been initially associated 
with JI have involved forest management, afforestation or reforestation, it has 
been asserted that first world investors have sought to convert the third world 
into a huge biological or atmospheric reserve that denies the host nation the 
benefits of economic development enjoyed in the North. There are a number 
of factual misimpressions about such imagery. Identifying JI strictly with 
forestry ignores the wide range of potentially creditable investment in fuel 
switching, agriculture, demand side management, improvements in industrial 
energy budgets, energy technology development, and transportation. It misses 
the fact that much reforestation does not add to park space, but is focussed on 
land decimated by pasturage and other traditional agriculture uses that have 
left the resource unfit for any current alternative use. It is also the case that a 
modern vision of the forest products industry as a foundation for high value 
added application and distribution services has proven in nations like Chile to 
offer a base for economic growth and employment that is more promising 
than most more traditional and uncompetitive forays into crowded manufac­
turing markets.
Whatever the facts of forestry investment, what is more important to the 
argument is the underlying complaint that JI to ought be restricted because the 
prices of natural resources that attract foreign investors do not reflect the true 
social value of the assets being transferred. This complaint suggests that the 
host government in some way is either distorting prices through its own action 
or is failing to correct prices to reflect real resource values. A number of 
plausible hypotheses could support this contention. Land or other resource 
prices in the market could be too low because the host government does not 
regulate or tax so as to force the internalization of local social costs connected 
with the environment or health and safety. Alternatively, some large resource 
stocks may be common pool resources and so overconsumed because of a fail­
ure to establish ownership rights and associated proper incentives. But the un­
derpriced appropriation of common property resources is usually associated 




























































































vate ownership is established, the common pool problem should evaporate, 
although it is not impossible that those who have acquired an asset too cheaply 
might be more likely to underinvest in information about actual market value 
and thereby be more likely to undersell. It may also be true that the host gov­
ernment itself Is underpricing natural resource stocks that it controls and allo­
cating them even to foreigners too inexpensively. Where there is a history of 
corruption or local profiteering from foreign contracts, as was the case with 
oil concessions in the early 20th century in Latin America, this mismanage­
ment is predictable. Again, resources may be transferred at too low a price if 
inefficient government subsidies are attached to assets in question. Without a 
second assumption that there are information asymmetries that favor the 
multinational party, it is not self-evident why the value of any subsidy would 
not be capitalized into the sale price and captured by the local owner rather 
than the foreign investor.
The argument against transacting in misregulated economies may become 
more systemic and subtle (see Chichilnisky) in suggestions that natural 
resource prices in the market may be depressed below their optimal shadow 
price because a wide range of governments across the third world have under­
estimated the potential value of development strategies based on manufacturing 
and services. If the consequent public policies have led to the oversupply of 
natural resource commodities and their derivative products, the price of tied 
inputs would be reduced below its real social cost. In this vein, the campaign 
against conservation services acquired through II seems to aim at economic 
activities that do not produce labor intensive production processes. Even if we 
assume that all expectable externalities have been properly included in 
resource prices and the price offered for conservation still represents the 
highest market value for the resource, the carbon colonialism charge would 
probably still lie because of presumptive employment effects. If it could be 
shown that the multiplier effects from conservation services were below those 
of other potential uses of the resources, it could be the case that regulatory 
adjustment of investment flows toward alternative projects would be prefer­
able. Nevertheless, it is interesting that if we examine the range of domestic 
investments or foreign investments other than II, there are not normally public 
regulatory processes that rank projects by their multiplier values and exclude 
those with lower priorities. The trend in the 196Q's to demand appropriate 
technologies that made better use of local labor supplies is no longer in vogue 
and was, at its height, rarely directed at national, as opposed to foreign, 
investors. In its avatar as employment policy, the fear of carbon colonialism 
may be a vestige of an era in large part left behind.
A related, equally colorful, though analytically distinct, charge against JI 
projects is that they are attempts by Northern countries to "pick off low 
hanging fruit". The claim depends on a distortion of a basic truth about all 
market based instruments proposed for the international environment. JI, like 




























































































total costs of any valued activity should be minimized. If a European energy 
firm can hold its carbon emissions to a prescribed level by improving agricul­
tural production in India with lower total expense than it could install new 
technology to scrub its waste output at home, the advocates of market instru­
ments see this as desirable. To point to the fact that the least costly alternative 
projects are exhausted first in a market scheme is to say that the market is 
working. This virtue is transformed to a threat by JI opponents who note that 
many of the least cost opportunities for greenhouse gas reductions are in the 
third world. They argue that since only the Annex I nations have assumed in 
the UNFCCC Convention obligations to stabilize their emissions, they will act 
through open international markets to exhaust these environmental assets. In 
effect, they see developing nations as the owners of fixed stocks of depletable 
resources that will be used up by a putative date in the future when all signa­
tories of the Rio Convention will have to take on liability for climate change 
issues. They argue that current sales of these lost cost assets (low hanging 
fruit) should be precluded so that the stock can be maintained for anticipated 
national appropriation.
There are several interesting, but contestable, perceptions that underlie the 
low hanging fruit case. First, it is not clear that JI projects are like other more 
familiar depletable asset stocks such as oil in the ground. Oil pools are bank­
able in the sense that their utility and accessibility are not normally dependant 
on the time of their extraction. The opportunities to harvest environmental 
services may be available only in limited time windows. Interdependency with 
other resource uses may constrain the ability to stockpile such assets due to the 
complementarity of their alternative uses with path dependent development 
elsewhere in the economy. In any case, since non-bankability argues against 
restriction of the international market, for host nations the force of the low 
hanging fruit logic must rest on a judgement that JI or more complete interna­
tional markets pose an unacceptable risk that national asset stocks will be sold 
at too low a price to first world investors. If we assume that low cost, de­
pletable environmental stocks are bankable, the tradeoff between their current 
sale and deferred use is given by the expected relation between the price of the 
asset and the market interest rate. If asset owners or public authorities who 
regulate the rate of depletion as a collective good believe that the discounted 
value of deferred uses of the resource is greater than the present value obtain­
able in market transactions, they will acquire and bank or require the banking 
of the asset. If not, sale is the rational choice. Futures markets will facilitate 
such decisions where they exist, but there is no obvious reason why host 
national governments or property owners are any less able to handle this eco­
nomic management question than the others they routinely face. Again, if it 
were asserted that these same nations ought to give up their autonomous power 
to manage other asset stocks like oil reserves because the analytics of the 
depletion problem were too tough for them, the intrusion on sovereignty 




























































































A final brief examination of the case against JI from the principle of "tech­
nology forcing" reinforces the conclusion that the central sources of the resis­
tance to market instruments are a distrust of markets combined with a lack of 
belief in the capacity, will or legal right of host nations to correct their fail­
ures. What I contest here is not the accuracy of these propositions, but their 
selective application in these particular instances. Technology forcing restric­
tions against II build on the insight that there will often be a tradeoff or substi­
tution between the development and applications of new technological solutions 
to the greenhouse gas emissions problem and investment in the range of Ji 
projects. It is sometimes argued there is a moral obligation on polluters to dear 
with emissions on site (the Clean Up at Source Principle). Such an asserted 
principle flies in the face of the least total cost maxims of economics tha, 
assume there is value to be realized precisely because there is no necessary link 
between the separate markets for production and environmental services. 
There is also a secondary hypothesis in the technology forcing argument that 
the market may err in valuing the real rate of substitution between investment 
in technology innovation and in JI projects. Here the failure to correct this 
purported mistake is probably best assigned to the home government which 
presumably is overcrediting the less efficient JI investment. Wherever respon­
sibility for the failure is laid, the harder challenges for this argument are two. 
First, it is unclear why it is believed that private actors will not correctly eval­
uate the total costs of the technology/JI tradeoff. Nor is it apparent that there is 
any public agency with better information than firms to make such technology 
policy decisions. Second, even if there are high returns to technology invest­
ment in the environment, it is quite likely that these gains will be more 
concentrated in developing countries than in the North. Because markets, 
including those that manage the substitution of competing factors and 
technology, are more imperfect in less productive economies, it is probable 
that investments in technology innovation in the South will yield a higher 
return than those in the North. Once we give up the prejudice that JI or other 
market instruments are tightly tied to forest conservation, it is the expansion 
of these international markets that should stimulate the incentives for investors 
to seek out and develop these technology based opportunities.
The expansive reasoning that JI should be restricted because it exacerbates 
endemic problems of price distortion, depletable stock management, or tech­
nology substitution simply heighten the stakes in what is really a single and 
singular argument. The logic of the case is more accessible than its validity. 
First, we can note that the claim that market prices in host nations are wrong 
and should be publicly corrected if they are to provide a legitimate basis for 
international transactions does not apply only to natural resources, but poten­
tially to all assets. If regulation is structurally miscalculated or absent, its 
problems will extend to other sectors as well. Second, the misallocations ensu­
ing from inefficient regulation would be no better or worse with JI than with 
other forms of foreign investment. Third, if these assertions about the quality 




























































































the host nation. Multinational investors, short of being complicit in acts of 
corruption or other invasions of the political autonomy of the host govern­
ment, are in this regard effectively price takers. Fourth, the proposal that the 
way to deal with the internal disabilities of host nations is to rule segments of 
the market out of bounds by means of international restriction, as proposed by 
JI opponents, would be considered an affront to sovereignty in normal politi­
cal discourse.
What would seem far more consistent with the usual strongly propounded 
tenets of sovereignty would be that: 1) the international community rely on the 
ability of each host nation to decide for itself the optimal use of its own 
resources; 2) the international community extend analytical and operational 
aid, where requested, to host nations seeking to improve their internal regula­
tory capacities; 3) that the local regulatory treatment of II be no different than 
that extended analogous classes of monetized foreign investment; and 4) for­
eign investors comply strictly with all locally enacted rules in the host nation. 
In listing these guidelines I do not mean to laud or endorse national 
sovereignty as the permanent organizing axiom of international order. My 
own view is that phenomena like climate change expose the debility of norms 
that reflect older theories and images of nationalism as the foundation of polit­
ical jurisdiction. Rather, these guidelines suggest that as long as the commit­
ment to national sovereignty is taken seriously by those actors, including JI 
host nations, who value it, there is nothing in JI that should cause them to 
deviate from that ideal.
If the recognized discourse of national sovereignty favors the integration of 
JI projects into comprehensively regulated domestic markets rather than the 
international restriction of JI markets in particular, there may still be good 
theoretical reasons to think about the value of compacts between host nations. 
It is possible that the capacity of host nations to regulate efficiently their 
domestic markets would be aided by agreements that coordinated the regula­
tory policy of these states. The object of such coordination would be to pre­
vent a "race to the bottom" or a dynamic process in which competition 
between host jurisdictions causes them to lower their effective levels of regu­
lation and thereby undoes the ability of any of them to take the measures they 
would otherwise prefer to solve their public goods problems. The analysis that 
predicts there will be races to the bottom and counsels the strategy of adopting 
reciprocal binding limits on domestic political action is complex. If a nation 
regulates efficiently so that the total cost of the incremental (marginal) unit of 
production exceeds the total benefit, it is not self-evident that it should adjust 
its level of regulation and allow the production of that unit simply because 
some other jurisdiction does so (Revesz). At the same time, the realities of 
national politics often include an asymmetrical ability of groups which bear 
different environmental and employment costs to marshall their influence in 
policy decisions. In addition, if investments are lumpy, information is costly 




























































































to assure, temptations to reduce chosen levels of regulation and attract flows of 
funds may be powerful. In these conditions, inter-jurisdictional pacts to pro­
tect local regimes may be appropriate.
The case for coordinating compacts between host nations does not, however, 
imply that such limitations ought be set up by means of a compulsory multilat­
eral regime that restricts II transactions. First, there may be nations that wish 
to reserve a complete autonomy in their domestic market for environmental 
services because they make very different evaluations of regulatory tradeoffs 
than do competing polities. Second, there are numerous other regulatory mar­
kets, such as the control of toxics, that are subject to race to the bottom pres­
sures. Where common multilateral regulatory standards are achieved, as in the 
Basle Convention on Toxic Wastes, they are related to a functional problems 
and extend to all economic activity in which these problems appear. These 
comprehensive agreements cover equally all investment that may destabilize 
national processes designed to internalize social costs and are not directed at 
one class of activity such as II. Finally, there is always a risk that international 
compacts to protect national regulatory systems can serve as a cover for price 
and output cartels. For example, many observers of the GATT regime which 
legitimates anti-dumping actions believe that the principal effect of the Treaty 
is less the control of predatory pricing than the imposition of cartelized grey 
markets. Multi-party commodity agreements and other price fixing arrange­
ments are common in the international economy. They could evolve as well in 
the market for environmental services with familiar allocative and distribu­
tional effects. In the absence of a better case that the multilateral regulation of 
II is the proper mechanism to deal with the general effectiveness of host 
country domestic regulation, it would seem wiser to limit the appropriation of 
UNFCCC protocols as instruments to manage the development of international 
environmental markets and compel emergent supply cartels to establish their 
own organizations.
The lesson of this argument is that host countries ought not set up a special 
legal regime for the regulation of II at either the national or the international 
level. Rather their stance toward the opening of the II market should be to 
incorporate II foreign investment into the more comprehensive rules and pro­
cedures that are used for more traditional forms of investment, domestic and 
foreign. If there are particular controls for depletable assets or social cost 
internalization that are applied to other transactions, so they should be applied 
to II. Where deregulation or a lack of regulation is the dominant policy for 
other sectors, so should it be for II in those sectors. A parallel position should 
be assumed with regard to international agreements. Where national regulation 
of the environment or industrial relations or occupational health and safety 
standards or competition policy needs to be fortified by coordination among 
competing national systems, it is appropriate to submit II projects that touch 
on those questions to the same pacts. The mistake is to imagine that II poses 




























































































this failure to recognize the familiar within the innovative that will impede the 
experimentation and learning about market instruments for the environment 
that JI should initiate.
2. Actions to develop JI markets
In those host countries where foreign investment is deemed to be consistent 
with national development strategies, it is possible to imagine a variety of steps 
that might be taken to facilitate the operations of JI projects. One class of such 
activities is to increase coordination with home country authorities responsible 
for crediting or granting offsets to investing organizations. This facilitation 
may relate either to reducing the transaction costs of entry into JI transactions 
or to assisting in the legitimation of II as an environmental instrument through 
quality control and process access.
Transaction time and expense in the approval of JI projects by home nations 
can be lowered if information about baseline definition in the host country is 
more readily available. Host nations may supply such information by having 
their representatives appear in JI administrative proceedings on a case by case 
basis to respond to inquiry and to provide an authoritative voice on issues like 
equity claims or subsidy policy. Alternatively, these same goals may be 
achieved not through interpleading of the potential host state, but by means of 
the signing of bilateral accords that establish pre-negotiated generalized stan­
dards and commitments for the evaluation of JI proposals. In addition, either 
case by case intervention or bilateral agreements can be useful in assuring the 
efficiency, as well as the perceived fairness, of processes for monitoring JI 
projects for compliance with contractual terms. In part, this can occur through 
informal or treaty arrangements for collaboration between government agen­
cies in the host nation and investigating bodies from the home country. In part, 
host country environmental agencies may take on some role in policing and 
reporting violations of the conditions assumed by investors in acquiring 
offsets.
In addition, as is true of enforcement mechanisms in the Convention for 
International Trade in Endangered and Protected Species, NGO's in the host 
country may play a key role assessing JI performance. NGO's may gain access 
to the administrative process in home nations that certifies qualification either 
directly or through a mediated process in which the complaints of NGO's are 
heard first in the host nation and, if found valid, then registered by official 
intervention in the home country evaluation proceedings. This latter path is 
followed, for example, in the NAFTA side agreements on labor and the envi­
ronment. Either direct or mediated monitoring by the host state will always be 
suspect due to incentives for national authorities to expand their global share 
of JI markets through lax enforcement. Given the distrust that home country 
environmental organizations will have for JI projects, it would be worthwhile 




























































































effects. Institutionalizing measures to support the recognition of multiple 
voices, including leading local NGO's, in the process of compliance monitor­
ing may enhance these national assets.
A second means by which host countries can affirmatively develop the JI 
market is through the provision of expert complementary services. These may 
include organizations to finance, insure, provide legal assistance or monitor 
potential JI projects. Where local institutions already exist to service mone­
tized foreign investment, what may be needed is only adaptation of existing 
specialized knowledge to the differentiated exigencies of JI. In those host 
nations where the growth of a market for environmental services opens oppor­
tunities for specialization and scale not previously available, greater public 
effort at industrial policy may be required. In all the cases the usual contro­
versies over the virtues and vices of allowing foreign providers in these 
expanding sectors will be replayed. However, one area of special competence 
may merit careful consideration for host countries. It may be the case rather 
quickly in the evolution of JI markets that transaction costs for investors may 
be lowered by the development of a range of syndicated projects or tradable 
instruments in portfolios of JI projects. Because the ability to acquire offset 
credit from the purchase of such an instrument will require close coordination 
between the marketer of the instrument and the home country crediting 
authority, it may be that multi-project assets may be initially sold by or 
through the host government. The problems posed by monitoring and evaluat­
ing the portfolio of projects represented by generalized instruments are suffi­
ciently complex that proposed solutions may at first be incorporated in bilat­
eral accords. Making a credible and creditable market in more advanced JI 
instruments should be treated by host governments as a separable issue from 
the wider universe of JI projects negotiated between private parties. It would 
be a mistake to interfere with the smooth operation of the latter transactions in 
the hot pursuit of the specialized demands of the former. Generalized instru­
ments do, at the same time, constitute, a prospect for market growth poten­
tially worth the development of ancillary institutional arrangements.
3. The roles of the private sector in the development of JI
The primary role of firms, acting individually or jointly, is to develop and 
implement JI projects. Since the underlying assumption of this analysis is that 
learning how to formulate and go beyond an effective JI regime depends on 
the accumulation of experience, the most valuable contribution that private 
firms can make is to build their portfolios to the point that JI investment is as 
routine as are other forms of foreign investment. This will certainly impose 
some measure of start up costs on JI market participants. Since new legal, 
organizational and scientific knowledge must be produced and administered, 
the uncertainty about the magnitude of these expenses always constrains exper­
iment with innovation. Especially in the early period when home country sys­




























































































evolve standards for II accreditation are still primitive, projects will require 
firms to support internal entrepreneurial efforts that would develop the orga­
nizational capital to deal competently with JI transactions. However, in as 
much as the most cost effective projects should also be available when the 
international market for climate change services first becomes accessible, there 
may be offsetting benefits to these lumpy investments in transactional innova­
tion.
The private sector may also perform a complementary role to investment in 
JI projects per se. Specialized firms offering expertise and economies of scale 
in scientific monitoring, JI project financing, insurance, legal services, and the 
brokering of syndications or generalized markets should proliferate on a com­
petitive basis. In some cases, these firms would have locational cost advantages 
in host nations. In other cases knowledge advantages may push toward home 
country specialists branching out from other technologies already developed. 
There is no need to predict or impose any particular topography of the even­
tual shape of the industry that supplies environmental services. With the 
prospective development of freer markets in service provision under the Gen­
eral Agreement on the Trade in Services, this new sector may be one of the 
first to grow under conditions that foster efficiency. In sum, businesses should 
do for JI what they do best in general: 1) search on a global basis for the least 
cost solutions that are in compliance with applicable legal regimes; 2) propose 
and carry out projects that yield a competitive return; and 3) be open to 
investment in novel forms of organization and transaction cost reduction that 
have been at the heart of modem productivity.
The ideal role of business or other non-profit associations with a concern 
for market instruments as environmental tools should be to husband the devel­
opment of efficient and legitimate JI projects and to nurture the gradual pro­
cess in which JI mutates into deep and comprehensive markets. In the agenda 
of activities that contribute to these ends we might list the following:
1) Act as a voice of non-government interest groups in the International 
Negotiating Committee and the Council of the Parties of the Rio con­
vention to forestall the imposition of restrictive conditions on the flex­
ibility of national JI regimes to experiment with different types and 
standards of market organization.
2) Work with business groups and public agencies in home and host 
countries to reduce the misunderstanding and lack of familiarity that 
now relegate JI to the domain of the exotic and thereby limit the growth 
of projects essential to the evolution of efficient markets.
3) Support with financial and organizational resources the reduction of 
common transaction costs associated with new corporate and govern­




























































































protocols for creditable JI projects. Especially in the early years of JI 
when regulatory standards, administrative channels, techniques for pro­
ject evaluation, and legal forms for JI investment are not yet routinized, 
there will be much inter-organizational common knowledge that must be 
created under conditions where free riding is likely. Subsidization of the 
development and diffusion of this common capital by collective associa­
tions will facilitate the emergence of these new markets.
4) Serve as organizers of sub-sectors of business that may have dispro­
portionate interests in the nature of home country JI regimes. We have 
argued that in the absence of formal and certain national drivers that 
offer offset credits as a return on JI investment, it is likely that some 
industry groups will have special incentives to advance the JI regime. 
The coordination of intra-sectoral action at both the national and inter­
national levels may be critical to its development.
5) Serve in the foundational period of JI markets as a broker of links 
between potential partner firms in host and home countries interested in 
particular genres of technology and investment. Business associations 
can maintain and tend the operations of networks of private enterprises 
which are accumulating experience with JI markets and complementary 
services to increase diffusion of organizational innovations in the field. 
As discussed under point 6 below, the role for industry group or other 
non-profit organizations in this arena may eventually be supplanted by 
the growth of private service providers.
6) Create an internal research group or support the action of associated 
research groups to provide clearinghouse services about the comparative 
national development of legal standards and procedures that are evolv­
ing in the public regulation of JI. Especially where national authorities 
may be relying upon the learning value of a common law jurisprudence 
in the formation of JI rules and where there is a cross-national prolif­
eration of bilateral accords and other decentralized efforts to structure 
the JI market, the development of competent and inclusive information 
services will be essential to the effective diffusion and refinement of 
public policy in the leading home and host countries, as well as to pri­
vate investors considering how to arrange a JI portfolio.
7) Work as a mediating organization between the governments of home 
countries and between host and home countries during the expected 
period when dissonant legal standards for crediting JI projects and dif­
ferent mixes of economic instruments including JI should be expected to 
arise in the expanding environmental services market. Rather than 
treating diversity in policy as a failure of the regime of JI and economic 
instruments, the business community should emphasize programs to 




























































































competition in environmental markets and actively lobby to facilitate the 
negotiation of common regimes that will eventually form the basis for 
comprehensive market organization.
Summary of main points
1. Economic instruments, taxes and property rights, are the preferred 
instruments with which to build an international climate change regime.
2. Because of political differences and cultural factors that characterize 
the UNFCCC multilateral forum in which climate change is negotiated, 
it is highly unlikely that any prospective agreement on the constitution 
of a prospective comprehensive regime will soon be forthcoming.
3. In these circumstances, the better path to this complete regime lies 
through a narrowing of the wide range of current divergent expecta­
tions by a learning process conducted by means of concurrent action in 
many local forums acting under competitive pressures. Joint implemen­
tation is a principal instrument for this indirect approach to a compre­
hensive regime of economic instruments.
4. In order for joint implementation to function in this way, interna­
tional negotiations must not close the door to its experimental use. Con­
sequently, any UNFCCC protocol on joint implementation should not 
restrictively regulate this market.
5. The home governments of investors in joint implementation should 
develop on a common law basis standards for the certification of high 
quality and marginally incremental projects.
6. The host governments of jurisdictions which receive joint implemen­
tation funds should treat these projects under the same rules and stan­
dards they use for other foreign investments. It is the sovereign pre­
rogative of such governments to decide if and to what extent they wish 
to participate in these markets.
7. The private sector should seek out least cost solutions in compliance 
with local law in which creditable joint implementation constitutes a 
major or minor part of the return on their investments. Business asso­
ciations may be active in the early years of these formative markets to 
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